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state tax notes®
Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
federal constitutional ground rules on taxing this
income. We conclude that federal constitutional
law permits states to tax the repatriated income in
the manner we recommend based on our policy
analysis.
Introduction: What Is the Repatriation?

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, the authors discuss how states should
treat income earned by the foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. corporations.
Readers of State Tax Notes know that a lot of
income earned by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations is coming home — or rather is being
deemed to be coming home under new IRC
section 965. There has accordingly been a lot of
analysis of how the tax laws of the various states
1
will treat this returning income. In this essay, we
take a step back and consider how state tax laws
should treat this income. We then analyze the

The old U.S. international tax regime
permitted multinational firms to defer payment of
tax on most of the income they earned overseas —
defer until the firm brought the money home. So,
for instance, until Apple Germany sent home its
profits to Apple U.S., those profits would not be
subject to tax. Naturally, Apple and other
multinationals let a lot of income hang out abroad
2
— an estimated $2.6 trillion in 2015.
To get this money to come home, a strategy
used in 2004 was to offer a special low rate.
“Repatriate now and pay 5.25 percent rather than
3
the usual 35 percent rate” was the 2004 deal. The
tax law just passed applies stronger medicine. The
new law deems all the income held offshore to be
repatriated and then applies a tax rate of either 8
4
percent or 15.5 percent. The Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates that this provision will raise
5
$338 billion over 10 years. To return to Apple, this
one company alone expects to pay $38 billion on
its $252 billion of repatriated earnings.6

2

Letter to Honorable Kevin Brady, Joint Committee on Taxation, Aug.
31, 2016.
3

1

Kathleen K. Wright, “Repatriation: A Huge Windfall or Only a
Modest Revenue Increase?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 2, 2018, p. 23; Peter L.
Faber, “The Final Tax Reform Act: SALT Implications,” State Tax Notes,
Feb. 5, 2018, p. 547; Alysse McLoughlin and Kathleen Quinn, “Tax
Reform: What the International Provisions Mean to the States,” State Tax
Notes, Feb. 5, 2018, p. 557; and Jeffrey A. Friedman et al., “Insight:
Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop: State and Local Tax Implications of
Federal Tax Reform — International Tax Provisions,” BNA Daily Tax
Report: State, Mar. 9, 2018.

For critical discussion of the 2004 holiday, see Chuck Marr and ChyeChing Huang, “Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose Revenue and Is a
Proven Policy Failure,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (June
2014). Note that the authors are much less critical about a one-time
transition tax spent on one-time needs such as infrastructure.
4

IRC section 965.

5

Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference Report
(Dec. 2017) at Estimated Budget Effects Appendix p. 6.
6

Daisuke Wakabayashi and Brian X. Chen, “Apple, After Tax Cut
Windfall, Will Bring Billions Back to U.S,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2018.
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Policy: Why States Should Tax the Repatriation
We can identify at least four broad reasons
why a state should tax the repatriation. These
reasons are not mutually exclusive.
(1) These Earnings Are Partially Domestic
There is overwhelming evidence that at least a
substantial portion of the earnings parked abroad
were, in fact, earned in the United States and
should always have been part of the domestic
corporate tax base. For instance, consider the
curious fact that there are a number of jurisdictions
in which the reported profits of U.S. controlled
subsidiaries represent multiples of the gross
7
domestic product of the entire jurisdiction. To take
one fun example, the profits of U.S. controlled
subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands represented
8
over 1,000 percent of that island’s GDP in 2014. We
also have a pretty good idea what kinds of
planning structures were used to create these
9
results. These first two clues fit together, as on the
one hand we know about the planning structure
known as the “double Irish Dutch sandwich,” and
we know as well that both the Netherlands and
Ireland are home to enormous amounts of the
profits of U.S. controlled subsidiaries relative to
10
those countries’ GDPs. Also of note is the longterm decline of the productivity of the corporate
tax relative to corporate profits.11 Accordingly, a
leading commentator concludes: “While the
magnitude of corporate profit shifting by U.S.
multinationals into low or no tax countries is
uncertain, there is overwhelming evidence of its
12
existence and its increase in recent years.”

7

“American Corporations Tell IRS That 61 Percent of Their Offshore
Profits Are in 10 Tax Havens,” Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy
(ITEP) (Nov. 5, 2017).
8

Id.

9

See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699
(2011).
10

See id. and ITEP, supra note 7.

The JCT has estimated the 2017 cost of deferral
to the U.S. fisc at $119 billion.13 Working backward
from that estimate and assuming that the avoided
federal rate was 35 percent, the JCT thinks that, in
2017 alone, $340 billion in U.S. corporate profits
did not come home. Some substantial portion of
that $340 billion was earned in the United States.
(2) Ability-to-Pay Principle
A corporation repatriating $252 billion to the
United States is better off than a corporation, with
similar domestic income, that is not repatriating
$252 billion. Because this is so, and, to the extent
that we have a corporate income tax in order to
apply the ability-to-pay principle to corporations,
the repatriated earnings should be reflected in a
corporation’s tax base.
To elaborate, although the incidence of all
taxes ultimately falls on people, corporations
nevertheless represent important nexuses of
economic activity. All else being equal, large
repatriations indicate greater economic activity
within a particular corporate nexus that should be
subject to tax.
(3) Progressive Taxation of Immobile Base
In general, tax policymakers must contend
with the fact that the most progressive tax bases
are usually the most mobile and therefore are less
efficient to tax. This is the textbook “equity14
efficiency” trade-off. The problem of
interjurisdictional mobility is especially pressing
for states within the free trade area of the United
States. But the deemed repatriation makes the
most mobile of capital immobile — it must return
and indeed it already has. Businesses cannot now
move out of state to avoid the tax on the
repatriation. Thus taxing the repatriation is
efficient because the base is immobile, and it is
progressive because some significant portion of
the repatriation is going to enrich wealthier
citizens.

11

See, e.g., Hunter Blair, “Corporate Profits Are Way Up, Corporate
Taxes Are Way Down,” Economic Policy Institute, Sept. 22, 2016; and
Gabriel Zucman, “Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and
Corporate Profits,” 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives 121, 133 (2014).
Also intriguing is how much more profitable foreign controlled foreign
corporations are relative to their domestic parents. James W. Wetzler,
“State Responses to Tax Planning by Multinational Corporations,” State
Tax Notes, July 21, 2014, p. 149.
12

Jane Gravelle, “Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?” Draft Paper presented at NYU School of
Law (Apr. 26, 2016).
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13

Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016-2020 at 28 (Jan. 30, 2017).
14

Here is a cite to a textbook: Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and
Public Policy 6-7, 597-600 (4th Ed. 2013).
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(4) Recouping a National Loss
One way to conceive of the huge pool of
earnings that accumulated abroad through a
quirk of the U.S. international tax system is that it
represented a form of forced national savings. Say
the $2.6 trillion had been deemed returned and
taxed at 35 percent. This would have yielded $910
billion that could then have gone a long way
toward funding any number of national priorities.
For instance, that money could have been spent
on infrastructure or, better still, capitalizing a
national infrastructure bank to create a large and
15
permanent source of funding. The new tax law
deviated from this sensible prescription in two
ways. First, the new law subjected the repatriation
to only a low tax rate, thereby in a sense
squandering more than half its value as
accumulated savings. Second, the one-time funds
from the repatriation were used as a way to pay
for permanent business-level tax cuts. Thus, a
state seeking to tax the repatriation and use that
one-time money for (say) state infrastructure
would in a sense just be recapturing a portion of
this squandered national wealth.
Moreover, an additional and related
federalism angle is worth noting, one that also
goes back to our first rationale. Ultimately, the
peculiar, prior federal treatment of corporate
income incentivized at least part of the erosion of
the state corporate income tax base. This
happened for two reasons. First, the federal
deferral rule gave corporations an incentive to
shift domestic profits abroad. Second, the 2004
federal repatriation holiday and the regular
consideration of additional holidays gave
corporations still additional incentive to shift their
16
profits abroad. From this perspective, states are
not only trying to tax shifted domestic profits, but
profits shifted because of flaws in national tax
policy.

Constitutional Framework
Our primary concern here is not with how a
new tax comports with current state law, but
instead with federal constitutional ground rules.
Here are the primary relevant federal
constitutional ground rules, as we see them.
First, any new tax needs to be fairly
17
apportioned. The Supreme Court has further
explained that it is particularly concerned about
double taxation to the extent a state tax involves
18
— or might involve — foreign income. That said,
the Court has upheld typical state apportionment
formulas in this context as appropriately sensitive
19
to foreign dormant commerce concerns, and so a
reasonable variation on the kinds of formulas
common in the states should likely pass muster.
Another approach to consider is to tax the
repatriation net of foreign taxes, especially as the
foreign taxes imposed are in many cases not likely
20
to be significant.
Second, any new tax cannot discriminate
against — or favor — foreign commerce.21 So, for
instance, if a state opted to tax the repatriation at
a higher rate than its ordinary corporate income
tax, this would appear like the state is taxing
foreign income at a higher rate. Arguably, just
taxing the repatriation creates a problem if one
conceives of the transition tax as falling on foreign
22
subsidiaries but not domestic subsidiaries. But
this is not the right conception if we are only
trying to tax domestic income. If the income in
question had been earned by a domestic
subsidiary, it would have been taxed — and a long
time ago — and thus there is no discrimination.
Given the sums of money involved, simply
applying a state’s ordinary rate should yield quite
a lot of income, but can a state impose a higher tax
17
18
19

Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 193.

20

IRC section 965(g) actually limits the amount of the tax credit
available against the repatriated earning to take into account the reduced
rate of tax applied to these earnings. Given that a state should tax these
earnings in full, a state should grant the full credits, if that is the
approach taken.
15

See Robert Puentes, Joseph Kane, and Patrick Sabol, “Establish a
National Infrastructure Bank Capitalized by a Repatriation Tax
Holiday,” Brookings (Aug. 2013).
16

Lisa De Simome et al., “Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash
Holdings: The Impact of Anticipated Tax Reform” Draft Paper presented
at NYU School of Law (Dec. 7, 2017).

21

Kraft General Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance,
505 U.S. 71 (1992). Note that the Kraft decision is not analytically sound
given that domestic and foreign subsidiaries are differently situated, see
Wetzler supra note 11, but passing a law that requires the Supreme Court
to overturn Kraft is not a best first choice.
22

See Friedman et al. supra note 1.
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on the repatriated earnings? Again, we think so if
a state takes the position that it is not taxing
23
foreign income but domestic income. We have
already seen that any state has an overwhelming
prima facie case that this is so; all those profits
residing in the Cayman Islands were not earned
there. As for domestic income, states can surely
tax that at different rates, subject to rational basis
24
review. Thus a state could make a reasonable
argument that it was taxing the domestic income
represented by a share of the repatriation at a
higher rate because this higher rate is meant as a
deterrent for future aggressive tax planning or
compensation for the time value of money and
other problems caused by the deferral.
A third important point here is that the
burden on a taxpayer challenging an
apportionment formula is very heavy: the
taxpayer must “prove by clear and cogent
evidence that the income attributed to the State is
in fact out of all appropriate proportions to the
25
business transacted in that State.” Thus, the
burden is not on a state to come up with the best
possible estimate of what percentage of the
repatriation was really earned in the United
States. Rather, it will be the burden of the taxpayer
to show that the state’s reasonable efforts clearly
fail.
Fourth, there is the unitary principle. New
IRC section 965 creates more subpart F income for
some foreign corporations. A state cannot assert
that a part of this income is part of the income of a
U.S. corporation unless those two firms constitute
a unitary business.26 This is true whether a state is
a combined reporting state or a separate reporting
27
state.
Fifth, states need to attend to the past. Any
state tax on the repatriated income needs to

23

We are not saying that a state could not choose to tax the
repatriation as foreign income, just noting that this approach creates
greater doctrinal complexity — complexity that a state need not engage
with.
24

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).

25

Container, 463 U.S. at 170 (internal citations omitted).

include some safety valve in the (unlikely)
scenario that some portion of that income has
been taxed already. For instance, suppose a state
requires worldwide combination, and a
corporation did not make a water’s-edge election;
in that case, the income earned by a foreign
corporation that is part of the unitary group has
been taxed.28
Sixth, states need to attend to the possibility of
nonbusiness income. Some of the repatriated
income might arguably represent investment
29
income. In such a scenario, the income cannot be
apportioned, but must be allocated.
Seventh, the states cannot mix and match tax
principles.30 Consider California. As a largemarket state that uses single-sales-factor
apportionment, California is in a strong position
to tax a sizable percentage of the repatriation as
earned within California. If California does so tax
the repatriation, it would be doing so according to
the source principle. But California has another
attractive option. Many of the big corporations
that earned this foreign income are domiciled in
California — think Apple, Google, Facebook, etc.
California could instead tax on the basis of the
residence principle. That is, California can tax all
of Apple’s repatriated income, subject to foreign
tax credits. Of course, if California went this route,
it would tax Microsoft’s share of the repatriation
very little, as it is not domiciled in California. It
would be nice for California to be able to tax
Apple based on residence and Microsoft based on
source, but that is a clear violation of internal
consistency. California must choose; except for
California and maybe New York, the preference
on revenue grounds should presumably be for the
source principle. More importantly, the source
principle is already at the heart of all state
corporate income tax systems.
Eighth, states should act with sensitivity to
retroactivity (due process) and contract clause
issues. The deemed repatriation happened last
year, and last year there were state law rules about
how subpart F income was to be treated. Any new
law will therefore raise retroactivity concerns; it

26

Allied Signal v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992).

27

A separate reporting state would have to enact a different statute so
as to deem the repatriated income as income stripped out of
corporations within the state. For some ideas about structures, see Mark
J. Cowan and Kathy Hurley, “Receding Water’s Edge: State Efforts to Tax
Corporations’ Foreign Tax Haven Income,” State Tax Notes, Nov. 2, 2015,
p. 403.
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28
29
30

See Wright, supra note 1.
Allied Signal, at 504 U.S. at 787-88.
Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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will also raise objections to the extent it changes
some aspect of a state’s earlier treatment of
subpart F income. The limited U.S. Supreme
Court case law on such matters gives the states a
lot of leeway,31 as seems correct to us given the
policy exigencies that states must cope with.
Recent cases that have attracted a lot of attention
in State Tax Notes indicate that state supreme
courts have followed the high court’s lead; we are
thinking of the various cases involving the
apportionment election under the Multistate Tax
32
Compact and also Dot Foods v. Washington
33
Department of Revenue.
Even if one grants that some of the recent
disputes have represented hard cases (and we do
so grant, though we think these cases correctly
decided), a well-crafted tax on repatriation should
be a much easier case. The federal tax law made
very significant changes to the federal tax system
in December 2017; it cannot be a violation of due
process or the contract clause if a state makes
reasonable alterations to its tax system in
response within a reasonable time. Note the
double “reasonable” here. As to timing, states
need to move expeditiously. There is no fixed rule,
but the longer the states take to act, the stronger
the retroactivity challenge. As to other changes,
the states are on the strongest ground when they
make retroactive changes to specifically cope with
changes that the federal tax law made last year —
in this case new IRC section 965. Using a
retroactive bill on repatriation also to deal with
other aspects of state taxation not affected by the
federal law would weaken the states’ case.
Tax Design
Our long discussion of principles allows us to
conclude with a much shorter discussion of the
design of the tax. There is more than one possible
approach, but we conclude with a sketch of one
possible approach in order to be helpful.
31

United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31, 33 (1994) (“Provided that the
retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the
wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the
legislative and executive branches. . . . Tax legislation is not a promise,
and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.”
(internal citations omitted)).

Remember, one of our recommendations is to
move expeditiously. Here are some features that
we would recommend for a new tax.
The design should make it clear that the
purpose in levying the tax is to reach repatriated
earnings to the maximum extent permitted by the
federal Constitution and that any income not
apportionable should be subject to allocation.
The tax should be accompanied by findings
that a significant source of the repatriation income
was earned within the United States. We think a
reasonable starting point for a percentage of the
repatriation earned in the United States would be
35 percent, which was the percentage of U.S. GDP
to that of the OECD in 2013.34 This is a
conservative estimate for many reasons, including
that many OECD countries (for example, the
Netherlands) were also tax havens, but we think
this is a reasonable place to start. Taking the $2.6
trillion figure, this means that $910 million of the
repatriated income was earned domestically.
Given the large number of years over which the
repatriated earnings were earned, we think states
should consider a very simple apportionment
formula, such as state GDP to national GDP or
state population to national population.
We think it appropriate to give corporations
an opportunity to challenge the resulting
apportionment of income. In most cases, it is hard
to imagine a taxpayer carrying its burden, but
there will be some cases for which we can imagine
that a taxpayer will be able to show that for state
tax purposes some income has already been
taxed.
Then there is the question of the rate. We think
a high rate would be appropriate, say the state’s
regular corporate income tax rate plus 10 percent.
Because this new tax is going to be imposed on a
type of domestic income, then the state legislature
should prepare findings to explain why this
higher rate is reasonable. This should not be hard
to do. These domestic earnings were stripped out
of the state’s tax base by means of aggressive tax
planning, and states are entitled to discourage
such planning. Furthermore, the ability to engage
in such tax planning is not evenly distributed and
so the success of this planning placed the burden

32

See, e.g., Gillette v. Department of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891 (2015),
cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2157.
33

372 P.3d 747 (2016) (en banc), cert. denied 237 S. Ct. 2156.

34

“Gross National Income,” OECD (undated).
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on other taxpayers inequitably. Or, if the state
could not shift the tax burden to less aggressive
taxpayers or those with less flexible business
models, then pressing state priorities, such as
infrastructure, were deferred because of the loss
of revenue. Catching up on poorly maintained
infrastructure is more expensive, for example,
than doing it right the first time. Finally, taxing a
less elastic tax base is the height of (tax)
35
rationality. States in effect reduce their tax rates
very substantially to attract less mobile capital;36
this would simply be an example of applying that
concept in reverse.
The new law should contain a severability
clause lest any provision, such as the higher rate,
be found unconstitutional.37
Conclusion
In coming columns, we will have a lot to say
about various other aspects of the changes
wrought by the new federal law. The repatriation
represents low-hanging fruit, but it is fruit that
needs to be picked sooner rather than later — and
with care.


35

Gruber, supra note 14, at 592-93.

36

For discussion, see David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax
Cannibalization and State Government Tax Incentive Programs,” State
Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p. 197.
37

Another complexity could be required if a court required inclusion
of the foreign factors. Courts have not so required in similar cases to
date. See Friedman et al. supra note 1. Furthermore, and crucially, this tax
is aimed at domestic income. Along with a severability clause, states
might nevertheless consider a backup formula for inclusion of the
foreign factors, perhaps a ratio roughly modeled on California’s Cal. Rev.
and Tax Code section 25110(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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